Abstract: One significant obstacle to meeting aggressive federal and state alternative fuel consumption targets is the relative scarcity of retail fueling stations that carry alternative fuels. Policies that encourage or mandate use of alternative fuel vehicles in government fleets, thereby increasing demand for such fuels, are one popular approach to stimulating further development of the alternative fuel retail infrastructure. I focus specifically on flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) that burn E85, a combination of 85% ethanol and 15% gasoline, to study the impact of government fleet composition on retail alternative fuel infrastructure. Using data from six states in the Midwest that account for over 60% of US E85 stations, I show that government fleet adoption of FFVs leads to an increase in retail E85 stations. This finding persists when using instrumental variables techniques to address the endogeneity of government fleet FFV purchases. I also explore whether fuel station retail market structure has an effect on alternative fuel availability and find no evidence that the presence of stations affiliated with integrated gasoline producers has limited the availability of E85 at the market level. Finally, I examine how the effect of government FFVs on E85 availability varies by state and discuss the differing policy approaches that these states have taken. * 105 St. George St., Toronto, ON M5S 3E6. kenneth.corts@rotman.utoronto.ca. Trevor Tombe provided excellent research assistance. I thank
Introduction
Due to concerns about carbon emissions, air pollution, and "energy independence," the US federal government and a number of state governments have set ambitious targets for reducing gasoline consumption through increased consumption of alternative and renewable fuels. While this can include alternative fossil fuels such as propane and natural gas (which burn cleaner than gasoline and may be more abundant domestically), the policy emphasis has increasingly narrowed to renewable fuels-primarily ethanol and biodiesel-which have lower lifecycle carbon emissions and can be domestically produced. Biodiesel, produced largely from waste and virgin vegetable oils, is blended with traditional diesel (typically at a ratio of 20% biodiesel or less) and burned in standard diesel vehicles. Ethanol is sold in low-percentage blends with gasoline (typically 10% ethanol) that can be burned in regular gasoline vehicles. In either of these cases, increasing renewable fuel consumption is simply a matter of getting more alternative fuel blended into the fuel supply burned in traditional vehicles. However, increases in ethanol consumption increasingly come from a higher-percentage blend (85% ethanol), known as E85, which can be burned only in specially equipped vehicles known as flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs).
Because large increases in consumption of E85 require both the widespread acquisition of FFVs and the build-out of a retail distribution infrastructure for E85, this market is characterized by indirect network effects similar to those present in hardware-software markets. As a result, the diffusion of this technology requires solving the chicken and egg problem created by such network effects. This paper examines some of the specific policies used to facilitate this diffusion in an effort to learn lessons that can ultimately be applied in other settings, as similar challenges will face other alternative fuel technologies such as hydrogen fuel cells and plug-in electrics.
In this paper I focus specifically on the use of government fleet acquisitions of FFVs as a stimulus to the development of the E85 retail distribution infrastructure. Many state and local government fleets buy FFVs, in part because of a federal mandate and a set of related programs implemented by state governments. Regulations requiring the acquisition of government fleet FFVs are intended to reduce conventional fuel consumption by government fleets directly, but also to reduce private consumption of conventional fuel by stimulating the availability of alternative fuels and alternative fuel vehicles for the public. 1 An array of tax credits and subsidies also provides other incentives for increased production, distribution, and retailing of E85. The combined effect of these policies, along with increases in gasoline prices, has bee rapid escalation of E85 availability and consumption in recent y n a ears.
I show in this paper that the acquisition of government FFVs does stimulate the establishment of E85 stations and that this result is robust to instrumenting to account for the endogeneity of government and individual vehicle purchasing behavior. In addition, this relationship is fairly robust across different states despite the fact that individual states have widely varying systems of tax credits and subsidies that affect the incentives to sell E85. Finally, contrary to suggestions by some industry observers, there is no evidence that the presence of gasoline stations affiliated with vertically integrated oil companies hinders availability of E85 in a market.
While alternative fuel consumption in general and the network effect aspect of their diffusion in particular are of interest to economists, little economics research on this subject exists. In a recent survey of economic policy issues related to automobiles, Parry, Walls, and Harrington (2007) discuss alternative fuels including E85 as one important response to the carbon emissions associated with gasoline consumption; they also specifically mention the difficulty of building an alternative fueling infrastructure as an impediment to increased consumption of alternative fuels.
Di Pascoli, Femia, and Luzzati (2001) note that in their survey that a lack of access to a refueling network contributes to the lack of diffusion of alternative fuel vehicles. Kuby and Lim (2007) analyze the technical problem of designing the planner's optimal network of alternative fuel stations. However, there appears to be no research examining the economic incentives for fuel stations to provide alternative fuels or the effectiveness of policies adopted to spur the development of a retail infrastructure for alternative fuels.
This paper takes a first step toward filling that gap in the literature. I draw on the methods employed in studies of other industries characterized by network effects. Many such studies appear in the recent industrial organization literature, including Gandal, Kende, and Rob's (2000) paper on CD players, Nair, Chintagunta, and Dube's (2004) paper on PDAs, and Clements and Ohashi's (2005) and Corts and Lederman's (2008) papers on the video game industry. While most of this literature estimates both sides of the network effect-that is, the effect of "software" availability on hardware demand and the effect of "hardware" installed base on software availability-in this paper I focus exclusively on the effect of the installed base of
FFVs on E85 availability due to data constraints described later.
Industry Background

The rise of ethanol
The 2007 
Flex-fuel vehicles
While all gasoline vehicles can burn blends of up to 10% ethanol, only specially designed flexfuel vehicles (FFVs) can burn ethanol in its higher concentrations such as E85. FFVs can burn any combination of gasoline and ethanol up to 85% ethanol, meaning that the two types of fuel can be mixed in any proportion in a single fuel tank. The vehicle's engine control system includes sensors that determine the level of ethanol in the fuel and adjust the engine's function accordingly. There is essentially no difference in the performance of the vehicle, and no additional maintenance is required. The one difference apparent to the driver is the lower pergallon mileage when fueling with E85, which is a direct consequence of its lower energy content compared to gasoline. E85 contains between 70% and 75% of the energy per gallon of gasoline, which limits the range of the vehicle and of course also affects the way one interprets the price per gallon of fuel.
A number of manufacturers market FFVs in the US, and most have done so for a number of years. Models offered tend to be pickup trucks, large sedans, SUVs, and minivans. FFVs are usually simply alternative versions of standard models (though some models are produced only as FFVs), and the manufacturer's cost of modifying a vehicle to be an FFV is estimated to be only around $100. The Alternative Motor Fuels Act of 1988 created incentives for automobile manufacturers to produce FFVs in order to help them meet their corporate average fuel economy (CAFE) standards (US Department of Transportation, US Department of Energy, and US
Environmental Protection Agency, 2002
). An FFV's mileage for CAFE purposes is calculated as miles per gallon of gasoline (not E85 or ethanol) consumed, assuming that the vehicle is fueled with E85 half the time. However, this credit was capped at the manufacturer level so that a particular manufacturer can improve its overall fleet fuel economy for CAFE purposes by a maximum of 1.2 miles per gallon through FFV production.
E85 fueling infrastructure
E85 is sold at retail primarily through traditional gas stations. The number of stations offering E85 has increased dramatically in recent years, roughly tripling in two years from around 400 in 2005 to around 1200 in 2007. The attractiveness for prospective E85 station operators hinges on three variables: the fixed cost of converting or installing the required tanks and dispensers, the price-cost margins they expect to earn per gallon, and the volumes of E85 they expect to sell.
The fixed cost of preparing the station to handle E85 depends on the station's existing equipment and space for new equipment, as well as on various grants, tax credits, and subsidies available to at least partially offset these fixed costs. The price-cost margin will be determined in part by the cost of obtaining E85 at wholesale, in part by what consumers will pay, and in part by per-gallon subsidies and tax credits that accrue to the retailer. Expected volumes will be determined by the number of FFVs within a station's served market and also by the fueling patterns of the drivers of those FFVs.
To carry E85, a gas station needs a dedicated underground storage tank for E85. E85 is typically, though not always, dispensed through a separate pump. In either case, the pump being used for ethanol requires some modifications in the materials used in the hoses, etc., in order to withstand the greater corrosive properties of ethanol. The Department of Energy estimates the cost of equipping a station to carry E85 at $50,000-$70,000 if the station must install a new underground tank, and at $5,000-$30,000 if the station can convert existing tank and must only retrofit or replace dispensers. The National Renewable Energy Laboratory of the DOE distributes a publication entitled "E85 Retail Business Case: When and Why to Sell E85," which lays out a cash flow analysis of an investment in E85 pump installation (Johnson and Melendez, 2007) .
This publication considers many scenarios and a number of variables. Roughly speaking, the conclusion is that installation of an E85 pump, even with the expense of a new tank, is profitable if (1) the station can maintain enough tanks and pumps to continue selling premium gasoline, (2) margins are no lower than for regular gasoline, and (3) the volume of E85 is about equal to an average station's premium gasoline volume. 2 Break-even volumes are of course somewhat lower if expenses are lower due to the presence of a spare tank and pump. There exist a number of federal and state tax credits for E85 infrastructure projects. NREL's analysis described above accounted for the federal tax credit, which was put in place by the Energy Policy Act of 2002. It provides a tax credit equal to 30% of the cost of E85 conversion, up to a maximum of $30,000.
In addition, five of the six states I study have their own infrastructure tax credit programs or other subsidies for E85 infrastructure investment, which are described in the Appendix.
Existing research suggests that consumer willingness to pay for E85 is tied closely to the price of gasoline, which is to be expected given that every vehicle that burns E85 also burns gasoline.
What the required discount to gas is remains a debated topic. Given that E85 has 25% to 30% less energy content per gallon, a consumer seeking solely to minimize fuel expenses would have very elastic demand near an E85 price that reflected that inherent energy content discount (i.e., if E85 sold at a 25% to 30% discount to gasoline on a per-gallon basis). Anderson (2008) shows that the preferences for ethanol relative to gas are somewhat diffuse, but that the marginal consumer is willing to pay a small price premium for ethanol over and above the energy contentequivalent price. Assuming that current levels of retail E85 penetration yield some local market power in E85, the retailer's optimal price is essentially a given discount from the gasoline price that reflects both the lower energy content of ethanol and the premium consumers are willing to pay for it. Therefore, the margin the retailer achieves is largely determined by the wholesale price it pays. This will be in part determined by the transportation costs incurred in delivering the E85, so proximity to a refinery is likely to be one important determinant of the attractiveness of offering E85. Ethanol is trucked from refineries to be blended at gasoline terminals, unlike gasoline, which travels primarily from refinery to terminal by pipeline. As a result, proximity to a refinery is an important determinant of wholesale ethanol prices.
One might also think that contractual arrangements between stations and fuel suppliers, especially in stations branded by integrated oil companies, could affect the decision to carry E85.
The 2007 Energy Act banned integrated oil companies from restricting installation of E85 pumps, the advertising of E85 availability, and the acquisition of E85 from independent providers as part of franchise agreements. The extent to which such interference occurred prior to the passage of this act is unknown, though the discussion surrounding the passage of the legislation suggests that it was a concern.
Mandates for government fleets
The primary federal mandate on government fleets' acquisition and use of alternative fuel vehicles is the 1992 Energy Policy Act (EPAct However, no such similar federal regulation applies to state fleets. 3 The EPAct regulations are fairly complex. Among other provisions, they provide an ability to bank credits over time, to acquire them from other fleets, and to partially offset (up to half in a given year) the required AFV acquisition credits through use of biodiesel (every 450 gallons of biodiesel consumed offsets one required AFV acquisition). Beginning in 2008 (after my data), states can also apply for a waiver of the AFV acquisition requirements based on a documented reduction in gasoline consumption through any means.
Complementing EPAct, a number of state laws and regulations require or encourage government fleets both to acquire alternative fuel vehicles and to fuel them with alternative fuels. These are difficult to exhaustively characterize, but examples contained in the Appendix demonstrate the nature of these requirements. The bottom line is that every one of these states has some kind of law, regulation, or executive order that aims both to increase the presence of AFV and/or FFVs in state fleets and to increase the proportion of alternative fuel used in those vehicles.
Data
The data consist of a single cross-sectional snapshot of the 567 counties comprising 6 states in would be omitted from the government fleet category. As long as this is not systematic, it is simply measurement error that will tend to bias the coefficient on the government vehicle variables toward zero. One might also worry that some government fleet vehicles may be registered to the county corresponding to the fleet headquarters rather than to the place of use.
State fleet managers I talked to disagreed about the extent to which this was likely to occur, but in at least one case where the state fleet numbers are known (and the entire fleet is centrally managed, unlike in some other states), my government fleet count in the capital county was smaller than the known state fleet size, suggesting that not all state vehicles are associated with the headquarters county. Since the government fleet number derived from state DMV data includes local and county vehicles, it is impossible to precisely double check the Polk numbers with data from state fleet managers. I also obtained a list of ethanol refineries, with complete addresses, from the Renewable Fuels
Association. This allows me to associate refineries with counties. I constructed the variable refinery distance as the number of miles to the nearest county with an ethanol refinery. The distance is 0 if one's own county has a refinery.
Gasoline stations and automobile dealers
The US Census Bureau's County Business Patterns database provides a count of gas stations in each ZIP code in 2006. I aggregate this to the county level and construct the variable station density, which is the number of gas stations in each county divided by that county's population.
This variable captures differences in the intensity of competition of the retail gasoline market across counties, which could affect E85 availability. Another indicator of the state of the gasoline market in a county is the gas price, which reflects both competition and the costs of gasoline. I obtained from www.gasbuddy.com average county retail gasoline prices in May 2009, denoted gas price throughout the paper. 
Demographics
The Census Bureau provides demographic data at the county level, as well as latitude and longitude of county population-weighted centroids and county square mileage. In the analysis presented, I use population and population density (population divided by the county's area in square miles) as controls. I also gathered and/or constructed from this source additional demographic variables: percent male, percent black, percent college graduates among adults, percent graduate degree holders among adults, percent of households earning over $100,000, the percent of those who work away from home who commute by car, and a set of variables capturing the age profile of driving-age residents (percent of driving-age adults between 16-29, 30-44, and 45-59, with 60+ being the omitted category).
From the Bureau of Economic Analysis, I gather data on the economic environment of each county and construct two variables that potentially control for heterogeneity in county characteristics. Ag employment share is the share of total employment in each county accounted for by agricultural employees. Growth is the percent growth in total payroll from 1997 to 2007.
Using data from www.uselectionatlas.org, I also constructed a variable defined as the percentage point margin by which George Bush outpolled John Kerry in the 2004 US presidential election (which is positive in 461 of the 567 counties). 
Summary Statistics
Empirical Model
The basic model
I seek to estimate the effect of government fleet FFV acquisitions on the expansion of the E85 fueling infrastructure. There are many potential entrants into the E85 retail market, since almost any traditional gasoline station can, for a relatively modest investment, install the equipment required to dispense E85. Assuming free entry into this market, an individual firm's decision whether to offer E85 depends on the fixed costs of entry, the costs of fuel, the demand for E85, and the decisions of other potential entrants. The equilibrium number of firms is in turn determined by the fixed costs of entry, the variable costs of the fuel, and the demand for E85. I estimate this relationship in reduced form:
where X i is a vector of explanatory variables that control for market-level differences in subsidies, fixed costs, costs of fuel, and demand for E85, and ε i is a mean zero error assumed to be uncorrelated with X i and the two counts of FFV registrations. Note that the number of E85
stations cannot be less than zero; this is therefore a regression with a dependent variable that is left-censored at zero. I describe later the econometric approach I take in addressing this censoring.
Demand for E85 depends on the number of FFV vehicles in the market, and also potentially on who owns those vehicles. I include private FFVs and government FFVs since the presence of private and government FFVs may affect incentives to offer E85 differently due to differences in their tendency to fuel with E85 rather than gasoline.
The control variables X i include state dummy variables in all specifications to control for differences in fixed costs of entry due to differences in state-level subsidies and regulations. This also controls for differences in the variable cost of fuel derived from differential state tax treatment of ethanol at the blender or retail level. Also included in X i in all specifications is refinery distance, which affects the variable cost of fuel. All specifications reported in this paper include population and population density as elements of X i to control for county heterogeneity.
Throughout Table 2 , which presents alternative econometric approaches, I include only these variables (in addition to state dummies) in X i because other variables contributed little additional explanatory power or had imprecisely estimated coefficients, and because the inclusion of additional variables made estimation of some of the models (the spatial GMM model described later, in particular) much more difficult due to their high degree of correlation.
After establishing a preferred econometric approach, I do include additional variables, recognizing that the number of E85 stations may be affected by other factors such as differences in market size, the number of gas stations that might potentially carry E85, the geographic proximity of stations to each other, the intensity of vehicle use in a market, and so on. In various specifications I control for these other potential sources of county heterogeneity by using the variables described earlier that reflect the conditions of the local gasoline market (station density and gas price), local economic conditions (ag employment share and growth), and demographics (the age, race, income, political, and education variables described earlier, as well as higher order terms in population and population density).
Identification and instruments
The basic identification in this empirical exercise comes from county-level differences in the number of government FFVs that is not explained by state fixed effects or by differences in population and population density (or other observable characteristics of counties, when included). Of course, one concern is that the number of government FFVs is endogenously determined and responds to E85 availability. In that case government FFVs effectively contains ε i in the equation above through its dependence on the number of E85 stations. This implies that the assumption that ε i is uncorrelated with the regressors is violated. In particular, since one would expect the dependence of government FFVs on E85 stations to be positive, this endogeneity generally tends to induce a positive bias in the coefficient on government FFVs. A second concern is that there could be unobserved determinants of the number of E85 stations (factors that contribute to ε i ) that are correlated with the unobserved determinants of government FFVs. For example, suppose that some counties had experienced their economic growth much more recently than others so that there were effectively mature counties and booming counties. Older stations often have three separate tanks for regular, mid-grade, and premium. Newer pumps tend to blend mid-grade at the pump from two tanks. Conversion of this third tank at older stations is often the most cost-effective way to introduce E85 to a station. 8 When discussing potential biases in this paragraph and elsewhere, I describe the contribution of the problem being discussed to the bias induced in the coefficient other things equal. The actual bias induced in a particular model will depend on, among other factors, the other variables included in the model and correlations between explanatory variables. 9 One could argue that endogeneity of private FFVs is not a serious concern because individuals may not have bought FFVs specifically for their ability to burn E85. Anecdotal evidence suggests that many individual FFV purchases are in essence accidental, and that many FFV owners do not even know that their vehicle is an FFV (for example, the Flex Fuel Vehicle Club of America, http://www.flexiblefuelvehicleclub.org/aboutus.asp, states that part of its mission is to "encourage consumers to find out if they own an FFV now"). In this view, FFVs are produced and sold by automobile manufacturers for the CAFE credit benefits and then sold to the public without any emphasis on the vehicle's FFV capabilities. Treating private FFVs as exogenous in the models estimated in the paper does not substantially change the results.
of brands offering FFV models increases FFV purchases but has no direct effect on E85
availability. Again, one may be concerned that FFV dealer-brands is correlated with unobservable characteristics of the county that are relevant to E85 availability (for example, rural cities may have lots of sellers of large American vehicles, which tend to be brands that offer
FFVs, and also have many consumers who are especially interested in fueling with E85 because they identify with the farmers who grow the corn it's made of). To deal with factors that can be easily hypothesized to be determinants of E85 demand or availability, I include additional control variables to try to limit the set of unobservable factors driving E85 availability.
Censoring
Because the value of the dependent variable-the number of E85 stations in a county-cannot take values below zero, this is a regression with a censored dependent variable. This means that the observations of the dependent variable do not fully reflect negative realizations of ε i when the dependent variable is at the censoring threshold (in this setting, when a county has no E85 stations). In effect, the implied errors have a positive mean when explanatory variables are such that the predicted value of dependent variable is low, violating the assumption the assumption that they are uncorrelated with the regressors. Failing to account for this generally leads to a bias in estimated coefficients toward zero. This is the classic setting for the application of Tobit regression. This assumes normality of the error ε i and then uses this assumption to correct for censoring. To deal with censoring, I therefore estimate among other specifications an instrumental variables Tobit model using Stata's implementation of Newey's (1987) two-step estimator.
This is also an example of a "count data" model, for which Poisson models are frequently Table 2 , which explores alternative econometric approaches.
to the
Correlated errors
There are several reasons to expect that the errors in this regression (county-level unobservables)
are not independent across observations. There are certainly relevant policy variables that vary from state to state, but to the extent that these have equal effects across counties in the state, they are fully absorbed in the state dummies included in all specifications. Thus, the concern here is about other correlations in unobservables across counties that occur either within subregions of a state or across state lines. Unobservable determinants of E85 availability that affect areas not corresponding to states could include the presence of a multi-county chain of stations that has greater efficiencies in, knowledge of, or fondness for developing E85 stations. Similarly, the effect of a wholesale gasoline terminal whose management was especially focused on selling E85 would generally have common effects across several nearby counties.
Because these sources of correlation in unobservables are likely to be geographically localized, I
want to allow for the spatial correlation of errors. under the assumption that errors are not spatially correlated. Table 2 presents the results from the basic model of E85 station presence in a number of specifications. The objective here is to explore alternative estimation methods using a parsimonious model. In all specifications, the dependent variable is the number of E85 stations and the level of observation is a county. The explanatory variables include only population and population density in addition to the two measures of FFV presence and refinery distance. More complete controls for county heterogeneity are incorporated in later tables, but population and population density capture a great deal of the variation across counties and are consistently significant across specifications. The first five specifications employ all 567 counties in the 6 states studied, while the last two drop counties with no E85 stations, as described later.
Results
Basic results and alternative specifications
INSERT private FFVs would yield an additional E85 station in a county. They also imply that a county loses one E85 station for approximately every 200 miles further it is from an ethanol refinery. I assess these magnitudes in more detail later.
Column (3) presents the results of Conley's spatial GMM model, which accounts for endogeneity and spatial correlation of the errors, but not censoring. Before proceeding to deal with censoring, consider these results. First, notice the similarity between the spatial GMM results and the linear IV results, both in the point estimates and in the standard errors. The stability of the estimates suggests that spatial correlation may not in fact be of much concern in this setting. To test this, I applied Moran's (1950) test for spatial correlation to the residuals from column (2). The test fails to reject the null of no spatial correlation with a p-value of 0.34 or greater in separate tests allowing spatial correlation up to 250 miles, 500 miles, and 750 miles.
As a result of these findings, I employ ordinary standard errors in all remaining regressions and do not attempt to control further for spatial correlation.
The remaining columns (4)-(7) control in various ways for the censoring of the dependent variable at 0. As described in section 3, I explore three ways of dealing with this: IV Tobit, IV Poisson, and omitting the zero-valued observations. Column (4) presents the results of the IV Tobit regression. Note that all coefficients remain significant. The coefficients for the two FFV measures are change only modestly relative to column (2), but the coefficient on refinery distance becomes twice as large in magnitude. This is consistent with large distances from a refinery being an important determinant of which counties have no E85 retail presence at all, but playing a weaker role in the number of stations among counties that are fairly close to refineries.
Column (5) For comparison, column (7) presents results from estimating the basic linear IV model of column (2) on the sample of counties with at least one E85 station. The key coefficients are essentially unchanged. The one interesting change is the lack of significance and smaller point estimate of refinery distance, which is again consistent with the suggestion that this plays a more important role in determining whether a county has any E85 stations than in determining how many E85
stations it has if it has any.
As described in section 3, I take the IV Tobit model as my preferred specification for the remaining empirical work. I take confidence in it from the similarity of the results to the results generated by alternative models that could also be applied to deal with potential spatial correlation or with the censoring of the data.
The main result to take away from these regressions is that there is a significant and sizable 
Additional county characteristics
Having established a preferred specification, I now include a number of additional explanatory variables to better control for county heterogeneity and to help rule out potential alternative explanations. Table 3 presents these results, all of which are modeled on column (4) of Table 2, which is repeated as column (1) of Table 3 for comparison.
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE Column (2) adds two controls for differences in retail gasoline markets across counties. One might expect that the intensity of competition, measured by station density or retail gas price, to affect margins on gasoline, which might affect both the equilibrium margin on E85 and the opportunity cost of diverting a pump from gasoline sales to E85 sales. However, neither of these variables is significant when included in this regression. Column (3) 
Additional specifications and robustness checks
The first two columns of Table 4 present estimates from specifications testing additional hypotheses about the determinants of E85 availability. The third and fourth columns of Table 4 present two robustness checks.
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE
Column (1) includes indicator variables for a county's presence in each quintile of the distribution of the penetration of gas stations affiliated with vertically integrated oil and gas firms. Recall that this is of interest because there is some speculation among policy-makers and industry participants that the presence of stations affiliated with vertically integrated firms may hinder distribution of E85 and other alternatives to these firms' petroleum-derived fuels. The estimates in column (1) demonstrate that there is no evidence for this effect at the county level;
the coefficients on the quintile indicator variables are not significantly different from zero individually, and tests fail to reject pairwise equality of the coefficients for every pair.
Recall that these are county-level regressions explaining total E85 availability in a county, not E85 availability at a particular station. Thus, a finding that vertically integrated station presence does not hinder E85 availability at the county level is in no way inconsistent with speculation that vertically integrated oil firms hinder E85 availability at their own affiliated stations. In fact, only 20% (155/772) of the E85 stations in the data are affiliated with a vertically integrated firm while an estimated 55% of all stations in these six states are. 12 In effect, what the regressions suggest is that this lower availability of E85 at vertically integrated firms' affiliates is more than offset by more independent stations carrying E85 in areas with high concentrations of vertically integrated firm affiliates.
Column (2) explores the possibility that there might be network effects or local spillovers in the availability of E85. This could happen if, for example, E85 pump installations or conversions in one market led to entry or learning by contractors that lowered the capital cost of installation or conversion for nearby stations including those in neighboring counties. To test this, I include in column (2) a count of E85 stations in counties within 50 miles of the focal county. As described in section 3, this is treated as endogenous, with the sum of all government vehicles in those same counties being used as the instrument. Adding this variable causes little change in the main coefficients of interest. The coefficient is signficant and negative, with the point estimate implying that 17 additional stations in these neighboring counties would reduce E85 stations in the focal county by one station. This would be consistent with a competitive substitution effect, where neighboring counties' E85 stations siphoned off demand from local stations among local FFV drivers. Given the small magnitude of the estimated effect, I do not make much of this finding, but rather take confidence in the main estimates from their robustness to the inclusion of this variable.
Column (3) interacts the main variable of interest-government FFVs-with state dummies. The instruments are the same as before, but with all govt vehicles now interacted with the state 12 Recall that the business directory used to estimate the percent of stations that are affiliated with integrated firms contains many fewer gasoline stations than are present in the County Business Patterns (CBP) data from the Census. The 55% estimate presented here is obtained by applying the county-level percent VI-affiliate numbers from the business directory to the CBP totals to estimate the total number of VI-affiliated stations, and then dividing this number by the sum of the CBP totals. That is, the estimate is a weighted average of the percent VI-affiliate figures from the business directory listings, where the weights are the CBP station totals.
dummies. The interesting questions in column (3) are whether the results of the previous specifications are being driven by a single state or two and whether the states have significantly different patterns of responsiveness to government FFVs that might be related to differences in tax credits and state fleet mandates. The evidence from column (3) suggests that the results are not driven by outlier states, but rather that government FFVs generally have a robust and positive impact on E85 availability across a wide array of particular state environments. Four of the states have positive and significant coefficients, with coefficients ranging from about 0.01 to about 0.025 (compared to about 0.01 in Table 3 column (1) for example). The two states without significant coefficients-Iowa and Missouri-have point estimates very close to zero (with at least two zeros to the right of the decimal place in every case-that is, with absolute value an order of magnitude smaller than the smallest significant effect). Of these, recall that Missouri is the state in which the fleet registration data quality is most suspect and that measurement error associated with capital county overrepresentation would tend to bias this coefficient toward zero.
Conclusion
The logic of using government fleet FFV mandates to encourage private adoption of E85 and FFV technology relies on two premises. First, forcing the adoption of FFV technology by government fleets is presumed to increase the incentive for private gasoline stations to offer E85 by creating demand for the fuel. Second, this increased availability of E85 at retail is presumed to increase retail demand for FFVs by stimulating the provision of the key complement, E85
fuel. The validity of the first assumption is demonstrated by the main empirical results of this paper. Unfortunately, the data available to me are not ideal for shedding light on the validity of the second assumption. I know only the stock of FFV vehicles; as discussed earlier, most of these vehicles were purchased prior to the widespread availability of E85, and many of the owners of these vehicles may not even know of the vehicles' capabilities. Data on the flow of FFV purchases in more recent years is required to estimate a credible model of retail FFV demand.
Work on the determinants of demand for alternative fuel vehicles remains an important topic for future research.
The results of this paper confirm the basic validity of the idea that creating a government-owned installed base of alternative fuel vehicles can spur the development of a retail alternative fuel distribution infrastructure. This of course does not speak directly to the cost-effectiveness of this policy or of its effectiveness relative to other methods of achieving this goal. It is possible, however, to interpret the results somewhat more finely (and speculatively) to get some suggestive evidence that might be used to address these questions.
First, one can assess the magnitude of the main effect, which would be an important factor in a more complete evaluation of this policy. The results from Table 3 suggest that an E85 station is added for every 100-170 government vehicles, depending on the specification. Consider the magnitude of this effect. If the average fleet vehicle were driven 12,000 miles per year at 20 miles per gallon, each vehicle would consume 600 gallons of fuel. 13 At this rate, 130-170 vehicles burning 100% E85 would be required to consume the 80,000 to 100,000 gallons of fuel that the National Renewable Energy Laboratory's business model estimates an E85 station requires to profitably invest in converting an existing storage tank to E85 (after accounting for federal but not state tax credits). Alternatively, a joint report of the DOT, DOE, and EPA (2002) indicates that about 200 FFVs are required to make one E85 station economically viable. The range of estimates in Table 3 is broadly in line with these estimates of the fleets required to spur E85 availability. Given that many government vehicles are likely to sometimes be fueled with regular gasoline rather than E85, these number seem quite sizable.
It is also interesting to consider the relative marginal and total effects of private FFVs. The estimates in Table 3 imply that the magnitude of the marginal effect of a private FFV is between 1/5 and 1/2 of the effect of a government FFV. The fact that this effect is always smaller is consistent with the idea that private drivers may be less likely to fuel with E85 than government employees driving fleet cars. 14 However, since there are on average ten times as many private 13 The Transportation Energy Data Book (2008) from Oak Ridge Natural Laboratories states that the average miles driven by a US federal fleet sedan in 2007 was 12, 372. 14 There are several reasons this may be likely. One is that certain government mandates require fueling fleet FFVs with E85. Another is that, as mentioned in section 3, many private FFV owners may not even be aware that their car is an FFV or may have bought their vehicle without regard to its FFV capabilities. While one might expect government FFVs to have a smaller effect on public E85 availability if they are centrally fueled, there are in fact very few dedicated government fleet fueling facilities for E85; only 26 in the six states I study.
FFVs as government FFVs in a county, the total contribution of private FFVs to E85 demand and thus availability may well exceed the total contribution of government FFVs in some counties.
Second, consider the cost effectiveness of this government fleet strategy. Given that FFVs, when offered for a model, are typically available at the same price as gasoline-only vehicles, a fleet mandate that results in no distortions in fleet composition (i.e., a policy that does not, for example, lead fleet managers to buy larger vehicles than required in order to obtain FFVs) is essentially costless to implement. If, in addition, the fleet then fuels with E85 only when it is economical (taking into account the relative prices of fuels adjusted for the lower mileage of E85), a government fleet mandate is essentially a costless initiative that apparently yields sizable benefits in terms of stimulating E85 availability. Many of the state fleet acquisition mandates described in the Appendix (but not the federal EPAct mandate) include specific language aimed at preventing distortions of fleet composition. Likewise, many of the state fleet fueling mandates specifically require the purchase of alternative fuel only when it is cost-effective. It is important to note that the ability to pursue this strategy at such a low potential cost is a direct consequence of the complete "backward-compatibility" of FFVs-that is, the fact that they can also burn gasoline as efficiently as an ordinary car. A fleet mandate strategy would be inherently much more costly in a technology that had more limited compatibility with an existing standard fuel.
It is interesting to consider the backward-compatibility of the most common or promising alternative fuels besides ethanol. These include biodiesel, electricity from the grid, and hydrogen, which can either be used to generate electricity on board in a fuel cell or be burned in a combustion engine. Biodiesel (very similar to petroleum diesel, but created from virgin or waste oils and fats) can be burned in standard diesel engines in up to 20% blends with petroleum diesel (the common 20% blend is denoted B20). Thus, there is really no chicken-and-egg problem for such blends; a large installed base of vehicles capable of burning these blends exists already.
More interesting is the case of pure biodiesel (B100), which does require a specially modified vehicle. Such vehicles can also burn lower blends or biodiesel or pure petroleum diesel. They are thus fully backward compatible with an existing standard fuel, much like FFVs. If the goal were to stimulate a retail infrastructure for B100, then the E85/FFV experience suggests that a government fleet mandate for B100-compatible vehicles could be effective.
When used in combustion engines, hydrogen is often (though not always) burned in up to 50% blends with compressed natural gas (CNG Plug-in electric vehicles that take their electricity from the grid present a different set of issues.
Standard plug-in electric vehicles are not compatible with any other fuel. However, because all plug-in vehicles, including those that are privately owned, are likely to be charged at a private charging station (that is, at home, at night), the need for a public infrastructure is more limited.
Both fleet vehicles and private vehicles share a need for charging stations-not for everyday use, but for extended range, such as on the highway. Thus, the fueling infrastructure needs of private and fleet vehicles overlap well, and it seems likely that government fleets of plug-in electrics would stimulate provision of public charging stations to some extent, though this would be highly sensitive to the nature of the use of the fleet vehicles (specifically, whether they were used for distances sufficient to require daytime charging). In contrast, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles are backward-compatible in the sense that they can also be fueled with gasoline; however, it seems likely that a government fleet plug-in hybrid would take its alternative fuel (electrical charge) at night from a private charging station and would more likely take on its non-alternative fuel (gasoline) from the publicly accessible infrastructure. Thus, a government fleet of such vehicles would likely do little to stimulate the provision of public charging stations.
15 See www.afdc.energy.gov/afdc/fuels/stations_counts.html. All specifications include (coefficients not shown) state dummies. Excluded instruments in columns (2)- (7) are all government vehicles and the quadratic polynomial of FFV dealers . Standard errors in parentheses: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%. All specifications include (coefficients not shown) state dummies. Excluded instruments in all columns are all government vehicles (in column (3) this is interacted with state dummies) and the quadratic polynomial of FFV dealers . In column (2) the number of government vehicles within 50 miles is also used as an excluded instrument. Standard errors in parentheses: ** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%; + significant at 10%. 
